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Abstract
The Thatcher-Major ‘permanent revolution’ massively changed the British civil service and
Whitehall. The political clout provided by strong prime ministerial backing was a key factor in
sustaining the momentum of change over the 1980s and 1990s. The process of change developed
piecemeal, in a step-by-step and, in some ways, even haphazard fashion, with ‘New Right’ ide-
ology just one factor. Economic and financial constraints were important in driving and sustain-
ing the Whitehall efficiency drives and managerial reforms of the period. Support from
managerially minded insiders and skilful prime ministerial businessmen advisers brought in
from outside were also crucial. In contrast, the Johnson government’s approach to civil service
reform may be self-defeating if it creates too much instability and needless strife, rather than
building on ideas and building up support at different levels from within Whitehall itself.
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HAROLD WILSON WAS once described as
displaying ‘a profound reverence for the
orders and mysteries of the civil service’. The
Labour prime minister, it was said, ‘would be
most upset if he ever thought he had caused
serious offence to a permanent secretary’.1
Margaret Thatcher, in contrast, showed no
such reverence towards the Whitehall system
and made causing serious offence to the man-
darin class and what it stood for into a central
plank of her government’s policy after 1979.
Twentieth century prime ministers, on the
whole, were content to leave civil servants to
run the civil service—Mrs Thatcher was not.
She was radical in her refusal to recognise the
career civil service as an institutional interest
in its own right, in her drive to ‘deprivilege’
it (in terms of pay, pensions, job security),
and in her resolve to tackle what she saw as
Whitehall’s inefficiencies and political preten-
sions. Her successor, John Major, was not in
her mould of the ‘anti-system’ conviction pol-
itician, and adopted a more consensual and
emollient style, but nevertheless, after 1990,
pressed ahead with further Whitehall and
public services reforms, with the scope and
the pace of change, if anything, intensifying.
The subtitle of the second volume of The
Official History of the British Civil Service, writ-
ten by Rodney Lowe and Hugh Pemberton—
The Thatcher and Major Revolutions—tells it all.2
If the Lowe and Pemberton theme is of ‘pro-
found crisis’ for the civil service and ‘funda-
mental reform’ building up over the years
1982–97, the contrast with the central theme
of Rodney Lowe’s first volume of the Official
History, described in the subtitle as covering
The Fulton Years, 1966–81 but with extensive
historical background on the Northcote-
Trevelyan and Fisher-Bridges eras, is strong.3
For all theWhitehall upheavals and reform ini-
tiatives of the 1960s and early 1970s—the
Plowden Committee, the (overrated) Fulton
report, Heath’s ‘New Style of Government’,
constant reorganisation and rejigging of the
departmental machinery—Lowe’s story there
is, in the end, of the failure or frustration of
‘modernisation’. What accounted for the dif-
ference in the Thatcher-Major era?
The political clout provided by strong prime
ministerial backing from Margaret Thatcher
and John Major was certainly a key factor in
sustaining the momentum of change. After a
couple of years, Harold Wilson and then
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Edward Heath had each seemed to lose their
interest in and appetite for Whitehall reform.
Thatcher was different and she did not let go
of the issue or get diverted. Major kept up the
pressure after 1990, partly as a way of estab-
lishing his own political identity (the Citizen’s
Charter being his ‘big idea’) and perhaps
partly because this was an area where his
embattled government could actually be seen
to be doing something and getting results. Suc-
cessive election victories and a long hold on
office after 1979 allowed the Conservatives’
reforms to build up a powerful momentum.
The civil service for much of the twentieth
century had the character of a self-governing
institution, confident in its power, a force to be
reckoned with, and secure in its role in the gov-
ernment of the country. The most senior
mandarins—Warren Fisher, Edward Bridges,
Norman Brook,WilliamArmstrong—arguably
had more influence on the development of the
civil service than either politicians or outside
committees of inquiry and royal commissions
of the ‘good and the great’ (the Fulton Commit-
tee being the last of this type of independent
inquiry into the civil service).4 Whitley negotia-
tions with the civil service staff-side trade
unions baked in a consensual and incremental
pattern of change from within. However, two
seminal events in 1981 (dealt with in Lowe’s
first volume) cleared the way for more a force-
ful and muscular approach, with elected politi-
cians in the driving seat—the defeat of the
twenty-one-week civil service strike (over pay)
of that year and the abolition of theCivil Service
Department (seen by Thatcher more as stand-
ing up for the civil service than as a driver of
managerial change).
Therewas no Thatcherite blueprint or coher-
ent strategy for a Whitehall revolution evident
in 1979. Instead, there wereMrs Thatcher’s gut
instincts and prejudices, and a general Conser-
vative faith in the superiority of private sector
business methods. The process of change then
developed piecemeal, in a step-by-step and, in
some ways, even haphazard fashion. The
influence of New Right thinking should not
be exaggerated, certainly in the early 1980s.
Later on, the government’s actions were often
presented as an ideologically coherent pro-
gramme involving a fundamental rethink of
the role of government (‘steering not rowing’
became the mantra in the 1990s), often with
reference to American public choice theories
and management gurus, but even then, ideol-
ogy was just one factor and probably not the
most important. British public administration
scholars were, as usual, kept firmly outside in
the cold.
The fact that the key management reforms
eventually won all-party backing, and were
to some extent based on earlier Fultonite ideas
endorsed by Labour, suggests that they should
not be seen as a simple ‘right-wing’ phenome-
non. The role of Labour MP Giles Radice on
Parliament’s Treasury and Civil Service Select
Committee was important in building that
bipartisan support. After 1997, Tony Blair’s
New Labour government continued with
executive agencies, ‘charterism’, contracting-
out and the focus on management, efficiency
and performance, though often relabelling or
rebadging administrative programmes and
techniques. And nor was Britain’s experience
unique, given the broadly similar ‘new public
management’ reform programmes seen in
other countries under governments of differ-
ent political complexions in this period.
An additional factor explaining the success of
the push for civil service reform in the 1980s
and 1990s, compared to the 1960s, is the chan-
ged context within which Whitehall and gov-
ernments were operating. The assumption in
the Fulton era was of rising public spending,
‘big government’ and expanding state activi-
ties. But from the mid-1970s onwards, the eco-
nomic constraints were much more pressing.
The experience of economic crisis and hard
times led to a tighter control over budgets and
a questioning of the functions of the state. The
party was well and truly over. This sharper
external pressure was an important back-
ground element in sustaining the efficiency
drives and cutbacks of the 1980s (and continu-
ing in the 1990s).
Successful bureaucratic reform needs strong
support from inside the machine. William
Armstrong was sometimes depicted as having
sabotaged or watered down the Fulton
reforms as civil service chief in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, but in fact the constraints
imposed on him by the vested interests of the
civil service unions and by the federal charac-
ter of the civil service, with the need to per-
suade, cajole and negotiate with the different
departments and sceptical senior Whitehall
barons, were significant drags on reform in
that period.5 In the later Thatcher period and
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throughout the Major years, Robin Butler’s
decision to concentrate more on his Head of
the Civil Service management role than on
the Cabinet Secretary and prime ministerial
courtier role that had absorbed his predeces-
sor, Robert Armstrong, made a decisive differ-
ence, as Lowe and Pemberton acknowledge.6
More generally, the emergence of a new
breed of managerially minded senior officials
mattered. In contrast to the Fulton period,
when the top mandarins had entered White-
hall in the 1930s and 1940s and hadmade their
careers in the halcyon postwar period when
resource constraints were loose, the new breed
had joined in the 1960s, had taken Fulton seri-
ously, were more cost-conscious and more
open to change than their predecessors.
Crucially important too in terms of the
mechanics of the reform process was the role
played by the outside businessmen brought
in as Thatcher’s Efficiency Advisers, Derek
Rayner from Marks and Spencer and then
Robin Ibbs from ICI. Earlier in the 1970s,
Heath had imported some business advisers
to try to improve government organisation
and decision making but they (mostly) had
made little impact then. In the 1980s, strong
and active primeministerial support and back-
ing gave Rayner vital clout, but also important
was the skilful way he worked with depart-
ments and identified allies inside the civil ser-
vice to generate an internal reform dynamic
through his ‘scrutiny programme’ and ‘effi-
ciency strategy’.
A key part of this process was the way in
which the Efficiency Unit, and later the Next
Steps Unit (particularly under the forceful
and unstereotypical top civil servant, Peter
Kemp) and the Citizen’s Charter Unit, showed
how small and focussed teams of committed
reformist officials could prod, push and prose-
lytise: wearing down departmental inertia or
resistance, keeping up the pressure for change,
and leveraging reform ideas and initiatives.
There had been nothing like these Whitehall
guerrilla fighters working to push through
the Fulton reforms, which had got bogged
down in the bureaucratic process.
The Thatcher-Major ‘permanent revolu-
tion’, as it gathered pace, massively changed
the Whitehall landscape. The civil service was
slashed in size from over 700,000 in 1979 to less
than half a million by 1997. Next Steps agen-
cies, the Citizen’s Charter, market testing and
contracting out initiatives had, as Lowe and
Pemberton show, a huge cumulative impact
on the organisation of government and on the
management and delivery of services. The
pre-Citizen’s Charter civil service did need to
become more responsive to the public-as-con-
sumer. The reforms delivered real benefits in
terms of improved operational and financial
management, efficiency gains and cost effec-
tiveness, even if some of the claims about
improved quality of services were more
debatable.
But the constant waves of reform also had a
destabilising effect on staff and their morale.
Furthermore, there were real problems con-
cerning the arrangements for ensuring account-
ability in the much more fragmented world of
executive agencies, delegated management
and a more ‘Balkanised’ civil service. In politi-
cally charged situations there was shown to be
plenty of scope for blurred accountability and
buck passing between ministers and agency
chief executives and civil service managers
when things went wrong. The government
and the Whitehall top brass themselves were
arguably too blasé or even disingenuous about
the constitutional implications of theNext Steps
and other managerial changes for parliamen-
tary and public accountability, and the mean-
ing of ministerial responsibility.
The myth that the real-world Sir Humphreys
could always resist change or ‘see off’ elected
ministers who had radical intentions and clear
priorities was finally laid to rest in the 1980s
and 1990s. The Thatcherites scornedWhitehall’s
consensus outlook and the departmental ortho-
doxies, and were determined to assert their
political authority over the mandarinate.
‘Macho ministerial management’ often seemed
to be the order of the day. However, the allega-
tions that the Conservatives ‘politicised’ the
higher civil service in this period were under-
standable but exaggerated. In fact, some of
Thatcher’s supporters were disappointed by
the failure to bring in large numbers of politi-
cally committed business outsiders. Rather than
a crudely partisan politicisation effect, therewas
more of a socialisation effect, in the sense that a
whole generation of officials learned that
advancement went to the ‘can-do’ types—
tough-minded managers who could get things
done and deliver results for their political
masters—while the traditional, cautious ‘snag-
hunting’ bureaucrats languished.
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The sort of detachment or ‘neutral compe-
tence’ once expected of the senior mandarins
in advising on and then implementing policy
was no longer enough. Also, ministers seemed
to trust civil servants less and not want to lis-
ten to their advice on policy. Decisions were
increasingly taken in more informal ways
(with fewer properly organised committees
with supporting minutes and documentation),
often at meetings of ministers and special
advisers from which officials were excluded.
Lowe and Pemberton show clearly how, in
the pursuit of a civil service more responsive
to the government of the day, the devaluing
of the continuity, experience in depth, and
more impartial or objective approach to policy
(‘speaking truth unto power’) institutionalised
in the civil service was raising serious ques-
tions about Whitehall’s traditional ‘North-
cote-Trevelyan’ values and about the policy-
making capacity of the state machine by the
mid-1990s.
‘Reform will go on and on’ Robin Butler
warned the civil service in 1996 and, sure
enough, there was no let-up in the pressure
for and the process of administrative reform
after the election of the New Labour govern-
ment in 1997, nor again after the change of
government in 2010.7 It is not clear, however,
whether there will be the sort of detailed paper
trail and records available covering the period
since the late 1990s, or the official backing and
support, for any future official historians of
Whitehall to produce a Lowe and Pemberton-
style excavation-in-depth and audit of the civil
service reforms of the last two decades.
History does not repeat itself, but are the
ingredients that made for the success of the
earlier Thatcher-Major civil service revolution
present today? Dominic Cummings, formerly
Boris Johnson’s chief adviser, seemed abso-
lutely to delight in inflicting serious offence
(and much more) on civil service permanent
secretaries. Cummings combined total con-
tempt for the organisation, methods, culture
and personnel of the state machine with iron
determination to drive through change, even
in the middle of dealing with the huge chal-
lenges of Brexit and the coronavirus pan-
demic, the poor handling of both of which, he
argued, underlines the case for fundamental
transformation in Whitehall. Boris Johnson
personally has never shown much sign of a
detailed understanding of the machinery and
processes of government, and only time will
show whether he will or can provide the sort
of sustained prime ministerial interest and
commitment shown by Thatcher and Major
that was central to shaping, driving through
and maintaining the reform impetus in the
1980s and 1990s.
There is a danger that Cummings’s combat-
ive methods and approach may have toxified
the issue and therefore jeopardised what
might otherwise be seen as sensible and neces-
sary reforms to skills, analytical and technical
capabilities, recruitment and organisation in
Whitehall. Alarm about the apparent purging
of some senior permanent secretaries also
raises the temperature in a way that hinders
rather than helps the forging of a bipartisan
consensus around reform. Recent changes in
Number Ten have brought in more conven-
tional figures to advise and support the Prime
Minister and introduce more order and pro-
cess at the top, and that may help defuse some
of the tensions.
While many officials understand and accept
the need for change, the government’s
approach may be self-defeating if it creates
too much instability and needless strife, rather
than building on ideas and building up sup-
port at different levels from within Whitehall
itself, as Rayner and Ibbs did for their political
masters in the 1980s. Ditching the Cummings-
style revolutionary sturm und drang might
actually open the way to more quietly con-
structive change and reform in Whitehall.
Kevin Theakston is Professor of British Govern-
ment, School of Politics & International Stud-
ies, University of Leeds.
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